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Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions:
Theoretical and Empirical Analyses
Mimako Kobayashi and Tigran Melkonyan
We model a game between two players taking biosecurity actions and characterize the Nash
equilibria and their properties for the cases of strategic complements and substitutes. Implications
of the theoretical model are investigated using data for biosecurity behavior among producers
participating in a livestock exhibition. Biosecurity actions with own beneﬁts and lasting impacts
in home communities exhibit a positive relationship with behavior of the producers from
geographically close areas. The number and probabilities of biosecurity actions taken by
exhibitors are positively associated with the number of animals exhibited and they vary among
commercial and hobby producers and across species/types of commercial production.
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Introduction
Nonnative species and diseases (otherwise known as invasives) adversely affect both animal and
plant species in agricultural production systems and ecosystems. An improved understanding of
factors affecting biosecurity actions and regulatory mechanisms attempting to prevent the spread
of invasives is exceptionally important,1 because economic costs associated with failed biosecurity
are substantial. For example, outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in 2001 in the United
Kingdom required the slaughter of more than six million animals, economic costs of over eight
billion pounds and resulted incidents in forty-four other countries (National Audit Ofﬁce, 2002).
Scientists predict that the light brown apple moth, identiﬁed for the ﬁrst time in the continental
United States in California in 2007, will cause crop damages of $118 million each year if the species
spreads and establishes itself throughout the United States (USDA-APHIS, 2009). Catastrophic
outcomes are often caused by poor biosecurity actions of one or a small group of private agents.
The above-mentioned FMD outbreak originated from poor biosecurity decisions of one livestock
producer (National Audit Ofﬁce, 2002).2 While one poor decision can lead to signiﬁcant adverse
consequences, the individuals or groups who tend to make bad decisions and their reasons are not
well understood. It is therefore imperative to examine what motivates decision makers to implement
biosecurity actions.
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1 Biosecurity can be deﬁned as “an ideal state of affairs in which measures are in place to prevent incursion and spread
of [invasives], or the approach or principles used to achieve this state of affairs,” and biosecurity actions may be taken to
minimize the risk of invasive incursion and its outward transmission (FAO, World Bank, and World Organisation for Animal
Health, 2007).
2 Food waste was not properly processed before being fed to hogs (DEFRA, 2002).Kobayashi and Melkonyan Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions 243
Decisions about biosecurity are often inﬂuenced not only by private costs and beneﬁts resulting
from individual actions but also by other economic agents’ biosecurity decisions. Thus, it is
important to examine the strategic interactions among decision makers when analyzing private
incentives for biosecurity actions and the effects of individual actions on aggregate biosecurity
outcomes. In a two-player setting, biosecurity actions are strategic complements when the marginal
beneﬁt of own biosecurity action is an increasing function of the other decision maker’s action.
In this case, an increase in a decision maker’s biosecurity action has a positive effect on the
counterpart’s incentive to increase her biosecurity action; that is, the best response functions are
upward sloping. Biosecurity actions are strategic substitutes when the marginal beneﬁt of own
biosecurity action is decreasing in the other decision maker’s action; in this case the best response
functions are downward sloping.
Understanding the nature of biosecurity actions and the context in which they are implemented
provides some intuition about whether the actions are strategic complements or substitutes. For
example, strategic complementarity likely arises in situations where all involved parties must choose
sufﬁciently high levels of actions for their collective choice to be effective (Burnett, 2006; Hennessy,
2008; Richards, Nganje, and Acharya, 2009). In the context of animal diseases, biosecurity actions
can also be classiﬁed into two types: “bioexclusion” (keeping disease agents out of a unit) and
“biocontainment” (keeping disease agents within a unit) (FAO, World Bank, and World Organisation
for Animal Health, 2007). Strategic complementarity is likely to materialize for bioexclusion actions
intended to protect some aggregate unit (e.g., village, industry) from disease introduction. Strategic
substitutability is more likely to arise in situations where free-riding incentives are relatively strong.
When the concepts of bioexclusion and biocontainment are applied at the level of individual herds,
one’s biocontainment actions beneﬁt others’ herds relatively more than one’s own, while the beneﬁt
of bioexclusion actions mainly accrues to one’s own herd. It is conceivable that, when many
production units take biocontainment actions, one may have lower incentives to take bioexclusion
actions to protect his/her own unit from disease introduction.
Existing theoretical literature on strategic incentives for biosecurity actions (Hennessy, 2007a,b,
2008) suggests that the effects of government interventions aimed at improving aggregate
biosecurity levels depend critically on the nature of strategic interaction among private decision
makers. A policy that improves on the non-cooperative outcome under strategic complements may
have detrimental effects under strategic substitutes. For example, Hennessy (2007b) demonstrates
in the context of a local livestock economy that when biosecurity investments are strategic
substitutes, subsidies targeted at small backyard producers may result in overall welfare losses.
Thus, sound policy-making requires knowledge of how economic agents would react to changes
in their counterparts’ biosecurity actions. However, we argue that in many practical settings one’s
biosecurity action consists of a combination of speciﬁc measures, each of which may serve multiple
purposes, such that the nature of strategic interactions for overall biosecurity actions is not always
apparent by casual observation. For example, a commercial livestock operation typically implements
a set of biosecurity measures including vaccination, quarantine of newly purchased animals, and
routine monitoring of animal health conditions. Some measures, such as disinfection of vehicles
going in and out of a livestock operation, can serve both bioexclusion and biocontainment functions
at the individual herd level. Since the combined effects of individual measures determine the overall
biosecurity level, the strategic nature of an overall level of individual biosecurity actions can only be
determined empirically. This calls for empirical testing for strategic complementarity and strategic
substitutability.
In this article we analyze both theoretically and empirically what motivates private biosecurity
actions, with special focus on strategic interactions among decision makers. We do so in the context
of a livestock show where participants implement multiple biosecurity measures to protect their
animals in preparation for, during, and after returning from the exhibition. A livestock show offers
a unique natural experiment in terms of differential extent of externalities of the participants’
biosecurity actions, depending on the timing and nature of the measures implemented. For example,244 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
while many biosecurity actions taken before a show will have direct beneﬁts to other participants,
actions taken after a show will have spillover effects on other livestock producers in the home
community. Therefore, by studying the behavior of livestock exhibitors and holding producer and
show characteristics constant, we can analyze how the nature of externalities affects strategic
interactions among participants.
We begin by developing a theoretical model that underscores the nature of strategic incentives
among livestock exhibitors to take biosecurity actions and draw implications regarding the effects of
show characteristics on biosecurity actions. The model involves two producers who take biosecurity
actions independently and simultaneously. We characterize the sets of Nash equilibria for the cases
ofstrategiccomplementsandstrategicsubstitutesandrelatethesesetstodominancepropertiesofthe
producers’ strategies. We do not impose any assumptions on the producers’ payoff functions except
for the nature of strategic interactions (i.e., strategic complementarity/strategic substitutability). This
allows us to underscore the properties of Nash equilibria and their comparative statics, which are
driven solely by the nature of strategic interactions.
We then empirically investigate private biosecurity incentives using a dataset on biosecurity
behavior among livestock producers participating in a California state fair livestock exhibition. To
our knowledge, this article is the ﬁrst to empirically estimate strategic interactions among livestock
producers making biosecurity decisions. Our results suggest that biosecurity actions that have own
beneﬁts and lasting positive externalities beyond the exhibition are likely strategic complements,
while few or no strategic interactions are found for those actions that have positive externalities
to other exhibitors and minimal own beneﬁts. We also ﬁnd that the number and probabilities of
biosecurity actions taken by exhibitors are positively associated with the number of animals taken
to the livestock show and that biosecurity behavior varies between commercial and hobby producers
and across species/types of commercial production.
Whilethetheoreticalliteratureonprivateincentivesforbiosecurityinvestmentsandotheractions
to prevent and control the spread of invasives is rapidly expanding (e.g., Bicknell, Wilen, and Howitt,
1999; Chi et al., 2002; Ranjan and Lubowski, 2005; Muhammad and Jones, 2008; Gramig, Horan,
and Wolf, 2009),3 only a handful of studies examine motives for limiting the spread of diseases and
invasives in the context of strategic interactions between parties making biosecurity or food safety
investments (Burnett, 2006; Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen, 2005; Hennessy, 2007a,b, 2008; Ceddia,
Heikkilä, and Peltola, 2008; Richards, Nganje, and Acharya, 2009). Several of the latter studies are
closely related to the theoretical model in this article. Hennessy (2007b) analyzes private investment
incentives to prevent disease introduction under strategic substitutability while Burnett (2006)
and Hennessy (2008) consider the case of strategic complements. These studies make important
contributions by providing behavioral explanations for the observations that have been made by
veterinary and epidemiological researchers and regulators. In particular, the strategic frameworks
developed in these studies make it possible to analyze potential causes of widely observed disparity
in biosecurity levels between small backyard livestock operations and larger commercial operations
(FAO, 2008; Ceddia, Heikkilä, and Peltola, 2008) and to design policy instruments intended to
achieve higher aggregate biosecurity levels.
Empirical literature on individual biosecurity actions is limited. Chi et al. (2002) estimate the
effectiveness of various biosecurity actions on dairy farms but not their determining factors. In
contrast, Gramig and Wolf (2007) estimate both the effectiveness and adoption determinants of
biosecurity practices intended for disease prevention on dairy farms. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997)
estimate factors affecting the adoption of a newly available vaccine for beef cattle. We are not
aware of an empirical study that estimates strategic interactions among biosecurity decision makers.
Though in a different context, Shafran (2008) provides an empirical analysis similar to this study
3 A number of studies (e.g., Mahul and Gohin, 1999; Elbakidze and McCarl, 2006) deal with similar decision problems
but at more aggregate levels (e.g., country). In this article we focus on a micro-level decision-making. For this reason, we do
not consider, for example, the aggregate market effects of invasion, including export market closure and impacts on domestic
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by analyzing homeowners’ choice of investment to protect their properties from wildﬁre risks; his
estimation results reveal that neighboring homeowners’ investments against wildﬁre are strategic
complements.
The Model
In this section, we develop a stylized model to examine the strategic incentives involved in making
decisions about biosecurity actions. We consider biosecurity decisions associated with participation
in a livestock show; decisions regarding biosecurity must be made in preparation to, during, or after
returning from the show. In a livestock show with two participants, producers 1 and 2 both face
the threat of a set of animal diseases. The two producers independently and simultaneously decide
on levels of biosecurity actions to protect their animals from potential infection.4 In this example,
we broadly deﬁne biosecurity actions as those that limit potential disease transmission from one
animal to another and those that facilitate early detection of infection. Examples of speciﬁc measures
include vaccination before the show, cleaning and disinfecting equipment, animal surveillance, and
quarantine after the show. Each producer (i = 1, 2) chooses between three levels of biosecurity
action: high level, Hi, low level, Li, and no action, Ni.5 The costs of these actions to producer i are
equal to Hi, Li, and 0, respectively. It is assumed that Hi > Li > 0.
We assume that an individual producer’s action imposes a positive externality on his or her
counterpart by reducing the likelihood of secondary infection through his or her animals. Thus,
the gross beneﬁt (in terms of avoided losses due to infection) to producer i is a function of both
producers’ actions. The gross beneﬁt function is denoted by bi(I1;I2), where Ii is producer i’s action
for i =1, 2. The functions b1(I1;I2) and b2(I1;I2) are increasing in both arguments, which reﬂects our
assumption of positive externalities. We normalize the two producers’ payoffs so that b1(N1;N2)=0
and b2(N1;N2)=0 and denote the game characterized in this section by G. Table 1 presents the
normal form of G.6
The following deﬁnitions (Topkis, 1979; Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985; Vives,
1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Amir, 2003) prove to be very useful in discussing the model and
its results:
Deﬁnition 1: Deﬁne the following total order i for each producer i; Hi Li Ni.7 G is a game
with strategic complements, or a supermodular game, if:
(c1) Player 1’s marginal beneﬁt from increasing his action is increasing in player 2’s action:
b1(H1;H2)   b1(L1;H2)b1(H1;L2)   b1(L1;L2)b1(H1;N2)   b1(L1;N2); (1)
b1(L1;H2)   b1(N1;H2)b1(L1;L2)   b1(N1;L2)b1(L1;N2)   b1(N1;N2); (2)
4 The actions in our model could correspond to a single biosecurity measure or a group of multiple measures. Explicitly
modeling and empirically estimating complementarity and substitutability between different measures for individual
producers would be very useful (e.g., Athey and Stern, 1998; Miravete and Pernías, 2010), but is beyond the scope of this
article.
5 Assuming three rather than an arbitrary ﬁnite number of biosecurity action levels simpliﬁes the presentation of our main
results, which can be easily extended to the general case with any number of action levels. We could have also chosen to
model a continuous strategy space rather than the case of discrete action levels, but this would have provided minimal beneﬁts
(if any) in terms of results and their exposition. The power and elegance of the theory of supermodularity is in large part due
to the fact that it requires minimal assumptions on functional domains and no assumptions of “smoothness” of functional
forms.
6 Many effects of biosecurity decisions are long-lived. One limitation of our model is that it is not dynamic. However, the
static model considered in this article is appropriate for the context of livestock exhibitions, which are one-time events. For
dynamic models of disease prevention see, for example, Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen (2005) and Gramig and Horan.
7 This order is “natural” as it corresponds to the ranking of costs of different action levels and the ranking of their effect
on the value functions.246 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 1. Normal Form of the Game
Producer 2























































































(c2) Player 2’s marginal beneﬁt from increasing his action is increasing in player 1’s action:
b2(H1;H2)   b2(H1;L2)b2(L1;H2)   b2(L1;L2)b2(N1;H2)   b2(N1;L2); (3)
b2(H1;L2)   b2(H1;N2)b2(L1;L2)   b2(L1;N2)b2(N1;L2)   b2(N1;N2): (4)
Deﬁnition 2: Deﬁne the following total order i for each producer i; Hi i Li i Ni. G is a game
with strategic substitutes, or a submodular game, if:
(s1) Player 1’s marginal beneﬁt from increasing his action is decreasing in player 2’s action:
b1(H1;H2)   b1(L1;H2)b1(H1;L2)   b1(L1;L2)b1(H1;N2)   b1(L1;N2); (5)
b1(L1;H2)   b1(N1;H2)b1(L1;L2)   b1(N1;L2)b1(L1;N2)   b1(N1;N2); (6)
and
(s2) Player 2’s marginal beneﬁt from increasing his action is decreasing in player 1’s action:
b2(H1;H2)   b2(H1;L2)b2(L1;H2)   b2(L1;L2)b2(N1;H2)   b2(N1;L2); (7)
b2(H1;L2)   b2(H1;N2)b2(L1;L2)   b2(L1;N2)b2(N1;L2)   b2(N1;N2): (8)
Note that since both value functions are increasing in the opponent’s strategy, G is a supermodular
(submodular) gamewith positive spilloverswhen conditions(1)-(4) (conditions (5)-(8))are satisﬁed.
Under conditions (5) and (6), b1(I1;I2) has decreasing differences in (I1;I2) (Topkis, 1998).
Similarly, under (7) and (8) b2(I1;I2) has decreasing differences in (I1;I2). In contrast, under
(1)-(2) and (3)-(4), respectively, b1(I1;I2) and b2(I1;I2) have increasing differences in (I1;I2).
Thus, under strategic complementarity, a party’s incentive to increase action is increasing in the
opponent’s action. As a result, the best-response curves are upward sloping. In contrast, under
strategic substitutability a party’s incentive to increase action diminishes as the opponent increases
action and the best-response curves are downward sloping.
Whether a submodular or supermodular game arises typically depends on the nature of
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model biosecurity actions as strategic complements when the aggregate biosecurity level is for the
most part determined by individuals contributing less or the least (i.e., individual contributions
are aggregated via weaker- or weakest-link technology). Similarly, Richards, Nganje, and Acharya
(2009) argue that food safety investments by ﬁrms in the agro-food industry are weaker- or weakest-
link public goods. In the context of a livestock exhibition, individual actions taken prior to the show
in order to prevent bringing disease agents to the exhibition (i.e., bioexclusion at the show level)
likely contribute to weaker- or weakest-link public good. Strategic complementarity would most
likely arise if an action were intended to prevent an outbreak of a highly contagious animal disease
that, once introduced into the show, could infect all participating animals.
On the other hand, Hennessy (2007b) models biosecurity actions taken by farms arranged along
a circle to prevent disease introduction into and transmission within a community as strategic
substitutes. In the current context of a livestock show, biosecurity actions that limit direct and
indirect contacts of one’s own animals from the other exhibitors’ animals, especially those from
neighboring stalls, have similar characteristics. In reality, a producer’s biosecurity action is usually a
combination of various measures whose joint effects determine the overall biosecurity level. In that
case, it is of interest to determine whether the group of measures exhibits strategic substitutability
or complementarity. Because both strategic complementarity and strategic substitutability scenarios
are identiﬁed in the literature we analyze the equilibrium strategic interaction for both cases. In what
follows, we assume without any loss of generality that neither player’s payoffs for two different
strategy proﬁles are equal to each other. Under this assumption, the players’ best responses are
unique.
Equilibrium Behavior under Strategic Complementarity
When G is supermodular it has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).
A supermodular game has the largest and smallest pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the given order.8
Furthermore, a supermodular game with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is dominance
solvable (i.e., using iterative deletion of strongly dominated strategies).
The following proposition follows immediately from Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Roberts
(1990). To preserve completeness and to further elucidate the strategic incentives of the players, we
provide a proof of the proposition in the appendix.9
Proposition 1: Suppose G is a supermodular game. Then,
(i) (N1;N2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if neither N1 nor N2 are strongly dominated;
(ii) (H1;H2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if neither H1 nor H2 are strongly dominated.
It follows immediately from Proposition 1 that if neither player has a strongly dominated strategy
then (N1;N2) and (H1;H2) are both Nash equilibria. When H1 and H2 are strongly dominated while
N1 and N2 are not, (L1;L2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if b1(L1;L2)   b1(N1;L2)>L1   N1
and b2(L1;L2)   b2(L1;N2)>L2   N2. Similarly, when N1 and N2 are strongly dominated while H1
and H2 are not, (L1;L2) is Nash equilibrium if and only if b1(L1;L2)   b1(H1;L2)>L1   H1 and
b2(L1;L2)   b2(L1;H2)>L2   H2.
We now turn to comparing the equilibrium behavior to the ﬁrst-best actions that maximize
total surplus: b1(I1;I2) + b2(I1;I2)   I1   I2. Consider the case where the ﬁrst-best is achieved
8 In our case, the order  over strategy proﬁles is derived from the orders 1 and 2 as follows; (I1;I2)>(I0
1;I0
2) if and
only if I1 >I0
1 and I2 >I0
2.
9 The proposition can be easily extended to the case with an arbitrary ﬁnite number of players and arbitrary strategy
spaces. Speciﬁcally, the largest and smallest serially undominated strategies will constitute a Nash equilibrium of a game
with strategic complements (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).248 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
when both producers choose high action levels: b1(H1;H2) + b2(H1;H2)   H1   H2 b1(I1;I2) +
b2(I1;I2)   I1   I2 for all (I1;I2). It follows immediately from Proposition 1 that the ﬁrst-best action
proﬁle (H1;H2) cannot be an outcome of the non-cooperative strategic interaction between the
two producers if and only if the high action level is strongly dominated for at least one of the
producers. Under the latter scenario, the equilibrium outcome is characterized by underinvestment
in biosecurity by at least one of the producers. This is the case frequently considered in applications
of supermodular games. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, a suboptimal outcome requires
that there exists a strategy that yields a strictly higher payoff than high action, irrespective of the
opponent’s strategy. In some circumstances, it is unlikely that this condition will be satisﬁed. For
example, a producer may prefer to choose high action when the other producer also chooses high
action, but not when the other producer chooses low or zero action. Intuitively, underinvestment in
biosecurity materializes when higher actions beneﬁt the others relatively more than oneself.
Next, consider the effect of changes in the general risk levels of disease introduction into the
show on the non-cooperative and ﬁrst-best biosecurity actions. One may expect that in a show
with high risk levels of livestock disease introduction biosecurity actions will have large total and
marginal effects on the beneﬁts to the investing producers. Thus, it is likely that the ﬁrst-best actions
in this case will be relatively large. As for the effect of an increase in the risk level on the non-
cooperative actions, it depends, among other things, on the effect of an increase in the risk level on
the degree of strategic complementarity between the two producers’ actions.10 A show with high
risk levels and a higher degree of strategic complementarity will tend to witness relatively high
biosecurity actions.
Equilibrium under Strategic Substitutability
We now turn to examining behavior when biosecurity actions are strategic substitutes. Using the
deﬁnition of submodularity we demonstrate in the appendix that:
Proposition 2: Suppose G is a submodular game. Then:
(i) (H1;H2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if L1 and N1 are weakly dominated by H1 while L2
and N2 are weakly dominated by H2;
(ii) (L1;H2) is a Nash equilibrium only if L1 weakly dominates N1;
(iii) (H1;L2) is a Nash equilibrium only if L2 weakly dominates N2.
Thus,bothproducerswillchoosehighactionsinanequilibriumonlyundertherelativelyunlikely
scenario where high actions weakly dominate all other strategies (part (i) of Proposition 2). A high
action by one of the producers and a low action by the other producer is a Nash equilibrium only if
the former’s low investment weakly dominates the zero action (parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2).
We now compare the non-cooperative actions with the ﬁrst-best. Again, consider the case where
the ﬁrst-best is achieved when both producers choose high actions. It follows from Proposition 2
that the ﬁrst-best action proﬁle (H1;H2) is not an outcome of a non-cooperative strategic interaction
between the two producers if and only if the high action for at least one of the producers does
not weakly dominate the other strategies. Contrast this ﬁnding with the corresponding result for
the case of strategic complements. There we have demonstrated that the ﬁrst-best action proﬁle
(H1;H2) is not an outcome of a non-cooperative strategic interaction between the two producers if
and only if the high action is strongly dominated for at least one of the producers. Since the former
is a considerably less restrictive condition, in the absence of all other relevant information, one
10 The degree of strategic complementarity is characterized by the effect of I2 on b1(I1;I2)   b1(I0
1;I2) and the effect of I1
on b2(I1;I2)   b1(I1;I0
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may expect underinvestment in biosecurity to be more likely under strategic substitutes than under
strategic complements.
Now consider the effect of changes in the general risk levels of disease introduction on the non-
cooperative biosecurity actions. This effect depends, among other things, on how an increase in the
risk level changes the degree of strategic substitutability between the two producers’ actions.11 A
show with high risk levels and a higher degree of strategic substitutability will tend to witness a large
variation in biosecurity actions.
Implications of the Model Results
We have determined and analyzed the sets of Nash equilibria for the cases of strategic complements
and strategic substitutes. It was found that divergence (if any) between the non-cooperative and
socially-optimal biosecurity actions depends critically on the nature of strategic interactions. For
example, it was demonstrated that private underinvestment in biosecurity is more likely to occur
when the actions are strategic substitutes than when they are strategic complements.
The impact of a change in a parameter of the game on the set of Nash equilibria will also be
inﬂuenced by whether the producers’ actions are strategic complements or strategic substitutes.
In the current context, provision of biosecurity measures by the show operator or mandatory
implementation of certain biosecurity actions are examples of policies intended to reduce disease
introduction risk. In a supermodular game, the reduced disease risk will likely result in reduced
actions by both producers 1 and 2. Thus, the public policy will have a crowding-out effect. In a
submodular game, if producer 2 responds to the policy by reducing his biosecurity action, this may
result in increased action by producer 1.
The above discussion suggests that it is important to reveal the nature of the strategic interaction
in order to determine the socially optimal biosecurity levels, to evaluate whether they are achieved,
and to uncover how they can be achieved. In most cases this latter task can only be accomplished by
conducting an empirical examination of the strategic interactions among a group of producers.
Empirical Analysis of Biosecurity Actions
We conduct an empirical analysis of the nature of strategic incentives in biosecurity decision making
using a dataset of livestock exhibitors at a California state fair. The data were collected through
an on-site survey of livestock exhibitors at the 2005 California State Fair (Thunes and Carpenter,
2007). Researchers from the Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance (CADMS),
University of California, Davis, visited the fair on three days during the twenty-three-day livestock
exhibition. Two-page paper questionnaires were handed out to exhibitors present on those three
days. The researchers waited while respondents ﬁlled out the questionnaires. Respondents were
asked about biosecurity actions that were directly associated with the participation in the fair, as
opposed to routine biosecurity practices: they were asked whether they took or were planning to
take certain speciﬁc measures before, at, and after the fair.12 They were also asked to report their
home counties and other producer-speciﬁc information. Of the 137 producers surveyed, the majority
came from California, representing 40 of its 58 counties. Three respondents came from Oregon
and one from Arizona. Because of the manner in which we deﬁne producer “communities” (see
below), we drop these non-California observations from the analyses. There were two respondents
who did not indicate their home counties and one that did not bring any animals to the fair. These
observations were also dropped, resulting in 130 observations. We also use county-level secondary
data that characterize the respondents’ home communities. County-level variables were selected
from the 2002 Agricultural Census data (USDA-NASS, 2004).
11 Similarly to the degree of strategic complementarity, the degree of strategic substitutability is characterized by the effect
of I2 on b1(I1;I2)   b1(I0
1;I2) and the effect of I1 on b2(I1;I2)   b1(I1;I0
2).
12 We are not aware of biosecurity measures that were mandatory for participation.250 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 2 lists all of the variables used in the empirical analysis with their deﬁnitions and summary
statistics. Survey respondents were given a list of biosecurity measures and asked whether they had
taken or planned to take those. Survey responses suggest that most exhibitors took some biosecurity
measures: only 6.9%, 10.8%, and 9.2% of the respondents took no measures before, at, and after the
fair, respectively. Many biosecurity measures listed in the survey questionnaire pertain to cleaning
and disinfecting equipment and other items, while others are for actions that would limit direct and
indirect contacts between animals.
Depending on their nature and the timing of implementation, individual actions may cause
positive externalities to other fair participants, other livestock operations in the home community,
and/or their own animals that are left at home. The measures before3-before5 characterize actions
taken to avoid bringing disease agents to the fair, and hence to protect others’ animals at the fair
from potential infection through own animals (i.e., bioexclusion at the fair level). These actions do
not have direct effects on own animals and, consequently, have a minimal effect on own beneﬁts but
a major effect on the beneﬁts of other participating producers. In contrast, the measures after2-
after6 reﬂect actions to protect own animals left at home as well as the others’ animals in the
home community from infection risks associated with animals taken to the fair. The rest of the
biosecurity measures (before2 and at2-at8) protect own animals at the fair, protect others’ animals
at the fair, and protect own animals at home and others’ animals in the home community. Because
of these externalities, it is plausible that the latter two groups of biosecurity measures possess mixed
characteristics of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. Given the focus of this study on
strategic interactions, this distinction of the nature of externalities is important. The subsequent
analyses maintain the grouping of biosecurity actions considered in the survey.
The Empirical Model
A number of recent articles develop rigorous and sophisticated estimation procedures for discrete
games, with the majority of applications in the area of ﬁrms’ market entry strategies (e.g., Bresnahan
and Reiss, 1991; Draganska et al., 2008; Bajari, Hong, and Ryan, 2010; Vitorino, 2010). The
available estimation methods for discrete games with complete information, however, are applicable
only to cases with a relatively small number of players and often require the assumption of strategic
complementarity for identiﬁcation purposes (Vitorino, 2010).13
Our dataset likely reﬂects the equilibrium biosecurity behavior among 130 “rival” producers.
Given the large number of players we limit our empirical focus to the determination of the nature
of the average strategic interactions, and as a result the empirical analysis presented in this article
is less ambitious than the empirical market-entry literature. Instead of attempting to construct a
structural form representation that allows for parameter identiﬁcation of the best response functions
of individual producers, we work with aggregate and reduced form equations that correspond to a
solution of the underlying strategic interaction. More speciﬁcally, we investigate the directions of
the strategic interactions by regressing the biosecurity actions of individual producers on the average
actions of the other participating producers from the same part of California and the average actions
oftherestoftheproducers,alongwithothercovaraites.Thisspeciﬁcationisbasedontheassumption
that one’s actions vary with the aggregate biosecurity level achieved through the contributions by
the others, rather than the permutations of all the other individuals’ actions.14 The speciﬁcation also
allowsustotestwhetherthestrategicinteractionsarestrongeramongproducersfromgeographically
close locations.
13 The estimation technique for discrete games with incomplete information presented by Vitorino (2010) allows for the
test of the nature of strategic interactions. However, the computation is extremely demanding under the estimation technique,
and it is beyond the scope of the present article given data availability. We are now in the process of collecting data that will
allow for application of these estimation techniques for discrete games.
14 This approach is similar to distributional interactions discussed by Manski (2010).Kobayashi and Melkonyan Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions 251
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Description Obs. Mean St. Dev.
before1 No biosecurity taken before the fair (0/1) 130 0.069 0.255
before2 Vaccination (0/1) 130 0.615 0.488
before3 Disinfect truck/trailer (0/1) 130 0.377 0.486
before4 Disinfect boots/shoes (0/1) 130 0.192 0.396
before5 Visually inspect animals (0/1) 130 0.754 0.432
before6 Other measures (0/1) 130 0.100 0.301
at1 No biosecurity taken at the fair (0/1) 130 0.108 0.311
at2 Hand sanitizer use by visitors (0/1) 130 0.054 0.227
at3 Restrict touching of animals by visitors (0/1) 130 0.369 0.484
at4 Disinfect boots/shoes 130 0.092 0.291
at5 Hand sanitizer use after visiting others’ pens (0/1) 130 0.392 0.490
at6 Restrict direct animal contacts with others’ animals (0/1) 130 0.485 0.502
at7 No equipment sharing (0/1) 130 0.608 0.490
at8 Disinfect pen before use (0/1) 130 0.246 0.432
at9 Other measures (0/1) 130 0.123 0.330
after1 No biosecurity taken after the fair (0/1) 130 0.092 0.291
after2 Quarantine of animals brought back from the fair (0/1) 130 0.269 0.445
after3 Disinfect truck/trailer (0/1) 130 0.377 0.486
after4 Disinfect boots/shoes (0/1) 130 0.131 0.338
after5 Disinfect equipment (0/1) 130 0.408 0.493
after6 Wash clothing/tools (0/1) 130 0.669 0.472
after7 Other measures (0/1) 130 0.115 0.321
bio_a Number of biosecurity measures taken out of before3-5 130 1.323 0.934
bio_b Number of biosecurity measures taken out of before2, at2-at8 130 2.862 1.669
bio_c Number of biosecurity measures taken out of after2-after6 130 1.854 1.398
B_ija Average value of bio_a by neighbors 130 1.296 0.193
NB_ija Average value of bio_a by non-neighbors 130 1.338 0.038
B_ijb Average value of bio_b by neighbors 130 2.887 0.588
NB_ijb Average value of bio_b by non-neighbors 130 2.937 0.134
B_ijc Average value of bio_c by neighbors 130 1.794 0.317
NB_ijc Average value of bio_c by non-neighbors 130 1.862 0.590
num Number of animals brought to the fair 127 5.370 5.321
cdensity County-level cattle population density (000 head/square miles) 130 0.085 0.091
cost County-level farm production expenditure-output ratio 130 0.903 0.189
com_beef Commercial beef cattle farm (0/1) 118 0.254 0.437
com_dairy Commercial dairy cattle farm (0/1) 118 0.178 0.384
com_swine Commercial swine farm (0/1) 118 0.051 0.221
com_sg Commercial sheep or goat farm (0/1) 118 0.169 0.377
Notes: Neighbors are deﬁned as all producers other than i in respondent i’s home county j and all of its contiguous counties.
We proceed by grouping the biosecurity measures, as discussed earlier, according to the nature
of externalities of each measure: group a includes the measures before3-before5, group b includes
the measures before2 and at2-at8, and group c includes after2-after6. We utilize three estimation
approaches to investigate the directions of strategic biosecurity behavior among the fair participants
for the three groups of biosecurity measures. In the ﬁrst estimation procedure, we construct three252 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
count variables and estimate Poisson count models using these variables as dependent variables:
bio_a represents the total number of measures adopted from group a, bio_b from group b, and bio_c
from group c. In constructing the count variables, instead of a simple summation of the measures
that assigns an equal weight to each of the measures, the aggregation process could use some kind of
non-uniform weighting to account for potential differential efﬁcacy and importance of biosecurity
measures. However, we have used uniform weighting since we currently lack objective (or reliable
subjective) weights for these measures.15 Second, in order to account for endogeneity between
own and others’ biosecurity actions, we implement the instrumental variable estimation based on
the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach using the count variables as the dependent
variables. Third, we implement the instrumental-variable probit (IV probit) estimation by pooling
the binary response variables for individual measures for each group of measures (e.g., for group a,
the binary responses for before3-before5 are pooled).
Let Bijk denote the number of biosecurity measures of type k =a;b;c that individual producer
i from community j implements (used as the dependent variable in the ﬁrst two estimation
approaches) and Bijkl the binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual implements
measure l and 0 otherwise (for the third approach). For all three estimation approaches, we consider
three sets of explanatory variables. First, to estimate the direction of the producer responses to
others’ actions, we include biosecurity actions taken by other producers as explanatory variables.
In doing so, we consider averages of the other producers’ actions. Let B_ijk denote the average
number of biosecurity measures in group k taken by exhibitors other than i in respondent i’s home
county j and all of its contiguous counties and NB_ijk denote the average number of biosecurity
measures taken by all the others (i.e., exhibitors that are not from own or contiguous counties).16
A similar empirical speciﬁcation is found in the context of estimating factors affecting homeowner
investment decisions against wildﬁre risks (Shafran, 2008).17 A signiﬁcant and positive (signiﬁcant
and negative) coefﬁcient on B_ijk or NB_ijk supports the hypothesis that individual actions are
strategic complements (substitutes). When B_ijk or NB_ijk has a positive coefﬁcient, a producer
is more likely to expect a higher private beneﬁt from taking an additional biosecurity action when
the other producers are expected to implement a larger number of biosecurity measures.
Due to the difference in the nature of externalities, we expect differential effects of B_ijk and
NB_ijk on Bijk and Bijkl across three types of biosecurity actions. For example, the measures in
group a cause positive externalities equally to all of the other fair participants, and thus the strategic
incentives are not expected to depend on the origin county of other producers. On the other hand,
the measures in group b and group c have lasting impacts and cause positive externalities in their
home communities. In these cases, we expect each producer to have “stronger” strategic interactions
with neighboring producers (represented by B_ijk) than with the rest of the producers (represented
by NB_ijk).
Second, we include a vector of producer-speciﬁc characteristics (X X Xi) as explanatory variables.
These variables are associated with the gross private beneﬁt function bi() and cost of biosecurity
actions discussed in the theoretical section. The vector X X Xi includes the variable num, the number of
animals taken to the fair, which ranged from 1 to 25, with a mean of 5.37 head per exhibitor (table 2).
The incentives toprotect own animals from infectionat the fair are likelyto increase with the number
15 Lynne, Shonkwiler, and Rola (1988) use a Tobit estimation to address a similar problem of potential measurement error
in a dependent variable constructed by simple summation.
16 Some counties have only one observation. Including observations from contiguous counties increases the number of
observations used to calculate the averages.
17 Shafran (2008) tests the hypothesis that homeowners’ investment decisions to protect their homes from a potential
wildﬁre depend on their neighbors’ investment levels. In his estimation model, Shafran (2008) includes a term for others’
actions, constructed as a weighted average of investment levels by all of the others in the dataset. The weights in his model are
based on the geographical proximity between homes. A similar variable construction for others’ actions may be applicable
in our case. Unfortunately, we do not have information about how the stalls were situated at the fair or the information on
the exhibitors’ home locations other than their origin counties. In a future project on biosecurity behavior of commercial
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of animals brought to the fair. As a result, the variable num is expected to have a positive coefﬁcient
and to be more important in explaining the decision for measures in groups a and b than in group
c. The vector X X Xi also includes other individual characteristics such as livestock species and types of
operation (e.g., hobby vs. commercial). The type and scale of home operation are expected to affect
the gross private beneﬁts, especially the beneﬁts from actions that have externalities to own animals
that were left at home (i.e., measures in group c and to a lesser extent in group b). Information about
the total herd size (in addition to the animals taken to the fair) is available only for commercial
units and thus we only control for the types and species of the commercial operations.18 More than
half of the exhibitors (54%) came from commercial livestock operations. The variables com_beef,
com_dairy, com_swine, and com_sg characterize the species and operation types of commercial
units that our California sample represents. Many are mixed-species operations, and these categories
are not mutually exclusive. The most common commercial operation type is beef cattle, followed by
dairy cattle, and small ruminants (sheep and goat).
Finally, the third set of explanatory variables is a vector of community-speciﬁc characteristics
(Z Z Z j) that are expected to affect the net private beneﬁt of biosecurity actions. To analyze the effects
of perceived disease risks on individual biosecurity decisions examined in the theoretical section,
we would wish to include variables that are related to disease risk of the livestock show (e.g., size
of the show, participant characteristics, animal species the show accommodates, and the time of
the year it takes place). However, the dataset includes only one livestock event and there would be
no variation in such variables across observations. Alternatively, the estimation models include a
variable that is likely associated with disease risk of producer home community, namely livestock
population density (animal disease risk is higher and disease spread is faster in an area with more
concentrated livestock population). We use the cattle population density, cdensity, since cattle are
the major livestock species in most counties represented in the sample.19 In addition to general
animal disease risk level, cdensity likely captures producers’ overall awareness about and experience
with biosecurity actions against infectious animal diseases. The vector Z Z Z j also includes the variable
cost, which is constructed as the general farm production expenditure divided by the value of the
total agricultural output for each county. Cost captures a part of the variation in the proﬁtability of
agricultural production across counties, which is supposedly related to the cost of biosecurity actions
and thus is expected to be negatively related to biosecurity actions.
In a Nash equilibrium, the levels of Bijk or Bijkl and B_ijk and NB_ijk are simultaneously
determined. To address the statistical problem of endogeneity, in the second and third estimation
approaches, B_ijk and NB_ijk are instrumented. Choosing appropriate instruments is challenging,
because they need to be highly correlated with others’ biosecurity actions but not with own actions.
We use as instruments the average levels of the variables included in X X Xi and Z Z Z j calculated for each
individual and for the two geographical areas deﬁned above (i.e., averages for home county, j,
plus all contiguous counties and averages for the rest of the counties). The rationale for instrument
choice is that average levels of explanatory variables likely explain the average actions of respective
groups of producers (i.e., B_ijk and NB_ijk) but not individual variations (i.e., Bijk). Indeed, use of
these instruments was empirically validated based on the tests of overidentifying restrictions as in
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p. 235): in the OLS regressions of Bijk on the original explanatory
variables and the chosen instruments, the coefﬁcients on the instruments were collectively not
different from zero according to F-tests for all three k.
The resulting estimation speciﬁcations are the following. For the Poisson regression, following
Cameron and Trivedi (1998), the log-likelihood function for our model can be written as:
18 The information is available only for totals of all species. As a result, interaction terms between the commercial herd
size and its species could not be constructed.
19 CountyareainformationobtainedfromtheNACO(NationalAssociationofCounties)websiteisalsoused.Thestatistics
are available at254 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics





ijkb b bk   exp(Q Q Q0
ijkb b bk)   lnBijk!g;
where:
(10) Q Q Q0
ijkb b bk =b0k + b1kB_ijk + b2kNB_ijk + X X X0
ib b b3k + Z Z Z0
jb b b4k;
and b0k, b1k, b2k, b b b3k, b b b4k denote the coefﬁcients to estimate (bold characters indicate vectors).
Similarly, for the GMM estimation we specify a linear model:
(11) Bijk =g0k + g1kB_ijk + g2kNB_ijk + X X X0
ig g g3k + Z Z Z0
jg g g4k + eijk;
where g0k, g1k, g2k, g g g3k, g g g4k are the coefﬁcients to estimate; eijk is the error term; and B_ijk and
NB_ijk are instrumented. Finally, for the IV probit estimation, we specify:
(12) Prob(Bijkl =1)=F(R R R0
ijkq q qkl);
where:
(13) R R R0
ijkq q qkl =q0k + q1kB_ijk + q2kNB_ijk + X X X0
iq q q3k + Z Z Z0
jq q q4k +å
l
q5kldkl:
f() is a normal cumulative distribution function; dkl is a dummy variable indicating biosecurity
measure l in group k; q0k, q1k, q2k, q q q3k, q q q4k and q5kl are the coefﬁcients to estimate; and B_ijk and
NB_ijk are instrumented.
Estimation Results
Tables 3, 4, and 5 report three sets of regression results for biosecurity action groups a, b, and c.
For all count model estimations, the Poisson speciﬁcation is not rejected based on the deviance-
statistic goodness of ﬁt test or the likelihood ratio test. For the IV probit estimation, the conditional
maximum-likelihood estimator is used for groups a and b, while Newey’s two-step estimator is
used for group c due to difﬁculties with convergence. All estimation procedures were conducted
using Stata 10.1. Although the three estimation approaches are based on different distributional
assumptions, the estimated directional effects (i.e., the signs of the coefﬁcients on the explanatory
variables) are identical except for four cases: the constant in group a and NB_ijk, com_swine, and
the constant in group b (the coefﬁcients on NB_ijk and com_swine are all insigniﬁcant).
Variables of special interest are B_ij and NB_ij. For group a, the coefﬁcient on B_ij is not
signiﬁcantly different from zero, while that on NB_ij is signiﬁcant and negative in the Poisson
model but not signiﬁcant in the GMM or IV probit models. This result suggests that there is
little or no strategic interaction among exhibitors, regardless of their origin, for actions to protect
the fair itself from infection. As discussed earlier, the existing literature typically considers these
types of actions to collectively form weaker- or weakest-link public goods, suggesting that strategic
complementarity among the players’ actions is likely to materialize (e.g., Burnett, 2006; Hennessy,
2008). Our empirical results do not support such expectations.
In contrast to group a, the coefﬁcient on B_ij is positive and signiﬁcant for groups b and c (with
the exception of the GMM estimation for group c), suggesting strategic complementarity, while thatKobayashi and Melkonyan Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions 255
Table 3. Regression Results for Group a (before3-before5)
Poisson GMM IV Probit
B_ija 0:30 0:85 0:52
(0:31) (0:70) (0:95)
NB_ija  2:77  0:48  1:98
(1:24) (3:36) (4:04)
num 0:03 0:03 0:04
(0:01) (0:02) (0:02)
cdensity  0:20  0:47  0:16
(0:42) (1:05) (0:98)
cost 0:09 0:25 0:08
(0:42) (0:51) (0:48)
com_beef  0:36  0:39  0:49
(0:11) (0:12) (0:18)
com_dairy 0:13 0:16 0:15
(0:13) (0:22) (0:23)
com_swine 0:54 0:94 0:88
(0:11) (0:38) (0:32)
com_sg 0:14 0:26 0:22
(0:18) (0:23) (0:20)






Observations 115 115 345
R-squared 0:03 0:14
Log Likelihood  150:30 1;086
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 are denoted by three, two, and one asterisks (***, **, *), respectively. Robust standard errors
in parentheses for Poisson and GMM regressions; standard errors in parenthesis for IV-probit regression. Log pseudo likelihood and pseudo
R-squared are reported for Poisson regression. Conditional maximum-likelihood estimator is used for IV-probit regression.
on NB_ij is insigniﬁcant in all cases. Thus, biosecurity actions implemented by other participants
coming from neighboring areas are strategically important, while strategic interdependence is not
found among those coming from other parts of the state. This is consistent with our expectation
that strategic interactions are “stronger” among producers from neighboring areas, because these
biosecurity measures impose externalities on other producers in the home communities. However,
the direction of the indicated strategic interaction is not necessarily consistent with the strategic
substitutability assumptions typically made for biosecurity measures to protect own herds (e.g.,
Hennessy, 2007b). Again because the same measure can usually serve both as a bioexclusion
and biocontainment measure and because the overall biosecurity of a producer is determined by
combinations of individual measures, the eventual nature of strategic interactions seems largely an
empirical question.
Further, since the three groups contain physically similar biosecurity measures, differences in
results between group a and group b/c models likely reﬂect differences in the nature of externalities
associated with each group of measures. Thus, predictions of a theoretical model may be misleading
if the model is based on an assumption regarding the direction of strategic interaction that does not256 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 4. Regression Results for Group b (before2, at2-at8)
Poisson GMM IV Probit
B_ijb 0:20 0:70 0:36
(0:12) (0:39) (0:15)
NB_ijb  0:27 0:24 0:20
(0:63) (1:89) (0:69)
num 0:02 0:06 0:02
(0:01) (0:02) (0:01)
cdensity 0:56 0:04 0:68
(0:74) (1:82) (0:71)
cost 0:28 0:50 0:45
(0:23) (0:82) (0:29)
com_beef  0:03  0:09  0:03
(0:11) (0:26) (0:11)
com_dairy  0:26  0:60  0:33
(0:11) (0:34) (0:15)
com_swine 0:15  0:02 0:22
(0:24) (0:68) (0:21)
com_sg 0:18 0:48 0:22
(0:12) (0:30) (0:12)
















Observations 115 115 920
R-squared 0:04 0:18
Log Likelihood  203:00 2;415
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 are denoted by three, two, and one asterisks (***, **, *), respectively. Robust standard errors
in parentheses for Poisson and GMM regressions; standard errors in parenthesis for IV-probit regression. Log pseudo likelihood and pseudo
R-squared are reported for Poisson regression. Conditional maximum-likelihood estimator is used for IV-probit regression.
take into account the extent and nature of externalities of biosecurity actions. In our application,
where the nature of the payoff function bi() is not known a priori, we can infer from the estimation
results that conditions for strategic complements (1)-(4) likely apply to the biosecurity actions for
groups b and c while conditions for strategic substitutes (5)-(8) likely apply to the biosecurity actions
in group a.Kobayashi and Melkonyan Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions 257
Table 5. Regression Results for Group c (after2-after6)
Poisson GMM IV Probit
B_ijc 0:66 1:50 0:83
(0:33) (0:93) (0:50)
NB_ijc 1:13 3:42 1:88
(2:26) (4:49) (2:60)
num 0:01 0:02 0:02
(0:01) (0:02) (0:01)
cdensity 0:33 1:06 0:45
(0:70) (1:17) (0:79)
cost  0:06  0:11  0:10
(0:27) (0:60) (0:35)
com_beef  0:28  0:52  0:31
(0:15) (0:26) (0:14)
com_dairy  0:17  0:52  0:21
(0:09) (0:29) (0:17)
com_swine 0:52 1:25 0:77
(0:17) (0:59) (0:26)
com_sg 0:33 0:94 0:42
(0:15) (0:31) (0:16)










Observations 115 115 575
R-squared 0:05 0:16
Log Likelihood  186:00
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 are denoted by three, two, and one asterisks (***, **, *), respectively. Robust standard errors
in parentheses for Poisson and GMM regressions; standard errors in parenthesis for IV-probit regression. Log pseudo likelihood and pseudo
R-squared are reported for Poisson regression. Newey’s two-step estimator is used for IV-probit regression.
Regression results for other explanatory variables are as follows. We ﬁnd a positive and
signiﬁcant relationship between the number and probability of the biosecurity actions and the
variable num in group b models. The net beneﬁt of biosecurity actions during a fair is likely greater
for livestock exhibitors bringing more animals. The coefﬁcient on the variable num is also positive
and signiﬁcant in group a models. This may be partially a result of scale economies associated with
these biosecurity measures, most of which involve disinfecting equipment and other items. On the
other hand, the coefﬁcient on num is insigniﬁcant in group c models. It is likely that the relevant
scale indicator for measures taken after the fair is the overall operation scale and not the number of
animals taken to the fair.
The coefﬁcients on the variables used to capture community characteristics (cdensity and cost)
are insigniﬁcant in all models. We conjectured that cdensity may capture general disease risk level,258 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
awareness, and experience with biosecurity, but no such effect is detected in the data. It is likely that
general farm expenditure is unrelated to the costs of implementing biosecurity measures listed in the
questionnaire.
As expected, the dummy variables representing livestock species/operation types of commercial
units are most important in explaining decisions to take post-fair biosecurity actions: all four
dummy variables for commercial beef, dairy, swine, and small ruminant operations are statistically
signiﬁcant in the models for group c (except for com_dairy in IV probit estimation). Across the
three biosecurity action groups we ﬁnd that relative to non-commercial producers, commercial cattle
producers (beef or dairy; com_beef or com_dairy) take fewer biosecurity measures or the probability
of taking each measure is lower. This is counterintuitive, because cattle are usually more valuable
per head than other livestock species. On the other hand, commercial swine producers (com_swine)
and sheep or goat producers (com_sg) tend to take more biosecurity measures or the probability
of taking each measure is higher. In general, swine producers are very conscious about biosecurity
because of the intensive nature of swine production, where animals are housed in a relatively small
area and a disease can quickly spread throughout the population. Thus, the positive and signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients on com_swine are sensible. However, dairy herds in California are also intensive, but
the coefﬁcients on this dummy variable are negative or insigniﬁcant. While these producers are
commercial livestock producers at home, they were exhibitors of show animals when surveyed.
The regression results obtained may reﬂect the value of livestock as show animals and may not
necessarily be generalizable to biosecurity behavior among commercial livestock producers.
Summary and Discussion
We developed a theoretical model and conducted an empirical analysis of biosecurity strategic
incentives. We theoretically modeled a game between two heterogeneous players taking biosecurity
actions. We have characterized the set of Nash equilibria for both the cases of strategic complements
and strategic substitutes, established the relationship between the non-cooperative and ﬁrst-best
biosecurity levels, and examined how changes in general risk level affect the players’ strategic
incentives. Although our theoretical model is based on a two-producer game, one can invoke the
theory of supermodular and submodular games to extend most of the results to the case of any ﬁnite
number of producers. Results of the theoretical model suggest that overall effectiveness of some
policieswilldependontherelativemagnitudeofstrategiccomplementarity,strategicsubstitutability,
and the scale of externalities of these actions. In these cases, sound policy-making should be based
on an empirical analysis of biosecurity behavior of individual producers.
The results of our theoretical model, as well as those in some other studies on the strategic
biosecurity investments, constitute rather straightforward applications of the theory of supermodular
games (Topkis, 1979). In contrast to the received theoretical literature on the strategic biosecurity
investments, however, we have chosen to present results that are driven solely by the structure of
supermodularity/submodularity rather than by assumed functional forms on the players’ payoff
functions.
Empirically, we used behavioral data on biosecurity actions of livestock exhibitors in California
to investigate whether their biosecurity actions are strategic complements or substitutes. We ﬁnd no
indication of strategic interactions for biosecurity measures that yield large positive externalities
to other exhibitors with minimal own beneﬁts. In contrast, for biosecurity measures that have
own beneﬁts and lasting positive externalities beyond the fair, we ﬁnd an indication of strategic
complementarity, whose strength depends on the geographical distance between the participants’
home communities. Coupled with the results of the theoretical section, these empirical ﬁndings
suggest that within the setting considered in the article underinvestment in biosecurity is less likely
to occur and that investments by a show operator to mitigate disease risk will likely result in
reduced biosecurity actions by participants. We also ﬁnd that the number of animals taken to theKobayashi and Melkonyan Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions 259
fair is positively associated with biosecurity actions and that biosecurity behavior varies between
commercial and hobby producers and across species/types of commercial production.
One limitation of the empirical analysis presented in this article is that the results obtained for
biosecurity actions among livestock exhibitors may not be easily applicable to routine biosecurity
behavior among general livestock producers. Another potential problem is the way variables B_ij
and NB_ij are constructed, particularly in the use of “average” actions by the other producers and the
choice of own and contiguous counties to represent a “community” in which producers strategically
interact.Weconsideronlytheaverageoftheotherproducers’biosecurityactions,becauseestimation
of a producer’s strategic response to each of the other producers’ actions is not practical. Alternative
methods of aggregation (for example, averaging by farm size or farm type) may capture differing
characteristics of the “others” and are worth investigating. The geographical extent of “community”
relevant for strategic decision making regarding biosecurity actions against livestock diseases, by
itself, is an important empirical question. Thus, collection of cross-sectional data using a survey
covering all types of livestock producers, which would include questions regarding subjective
deﬁnition of the “others” that matter to their decision making, is a natural next step to obtain more
robust results.
Finally, in addition to biosecurity actions to control contagious livestock diseases the strategic
incentives analyzed in this article characterize many other economic interactions. In fact, the
theoretical and empirical models in this article can be applied to any problem where an undesirable
agent spreads spatially across boundaries and an economic agent’s action to prevent the event or
mitigate the spread causes positive externalities to parties subject to the same biophysical process.20
For example, many problems of invasive species prevention and control/eradication fall under this
class of games. Food-safety investments by actors in agro-food value chains (Richards, Nganje,
and Acharya, 2009) and homeowners’ incentives to prevent wildﬁres near their homes to protect
their homes (Shafran, 2008) also have many key characteristics in common with the strategic
incentives examined. Theoretical and empirical analyses of private strategic incentives and the
resulting aggregate outcomes for this class of problems have a considerable potential to generate
valuable practical implications.
[Received March 2010; ﬁnal revision received June 2011.]
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we state and prove the following lemma for producer 1 which,
together with an identical lemma for producer 2, leads to the proposition:
Lemma 1:
(a) L1 is strongly dominated by H1 if and only if b1(H1;N2)   H1 >b1(L1;N2)   L1.
(b) L1 is strongly dominated by N1 if and only if b1(N1;H2)   N1 >b1(L1;H2)   L1.
(c) N1 is strongly dominated by H1 if and only if b1(H1;N2)   H1 >b1(N1;N2)   N1.
(d) N1 is strongly dominated by L1 if and only if b1(L1;N2)   L1 >b1(N1;N2)   N1.
(e) H1 is strongly dominated by L1 if and only if b1(L1;H2)   L1 >b1(H1;H2)   H1.
(f) H1 is strongly dominated by N1 if and only if b1(N1;H2)   N1 >b1(H1;H2)   H1.
Proof: We only prove part (a) of the Lemma. Proofs of the other parts are based on similar
arguments. Producer 1 strictly prefers H1 to L1 when producer 2 chooses N2 if and only if the
inequality in (a) holds. By supermodularity, if the inequality in (a) is satisﬁed producer 1 will
strictly prefer H1 to L1 when producer 2 chooses L2 or H2. Hence, L1 is strongly dominated by H1.
QED
Consider part (i) of the proposition. It follows from parts (c) and (d) of Lemma 1 that if N1 is not
strongly dominated then N1 is the best response to N2. By symmetry, if N2 is not strongly dominated
then N2 is the best response to N1. Thus, (N1;N2) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. The proof of
part (ii) is similar. Speciﬁcally, it follows from parts (e) and (f) of Lemma 1 that if H1 is not strongly
dominated then H1 is the best response to H2. By symmetry, if H2 is not strongly dominated then
H2 is the best response to H1. Thus, (H1;H2) is a Nash equilibrium. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: We only prove part (i) as the other parts have similar proofs. Suppose that
(H1;H2) is a Nash equilibrium. Then, b1(H1;H2)   b1(L1;H2)H1   L1, which combined with
submodularity implies that H1   L1 b1(H1;L2)   b1(L1;L2)b1(H1;N2)   b1(L1;N2). Hence,
H1 weakly dominates L1. The proofs that H1 weakly dominates N1, and that H2 weakly dominates
L2 and N2 follow the same lines. QED